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(ILLEGAL MIGRANTS) IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN 
SERBIA: AN OVERVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS IN A DIACHRONIC 
PERSPECTIVE
MARTA STOJIĆ MITROVIĆ
Institute of Ethnography SASA, Belgrade
The present discourse concerning asylum and irregular migration, with all its concepts 
and institutions, techniques and code of conduct, was introduced in the Republic of 
Serbia through the EU Accession process. As a prerequisite for visa liberalization with 
the EU (achieved in 2009), Serbia signed readmission agreements with the EU and 
its member-states and adopted the Asylum Law (Zakon o azilu 2007) and the Law 
on Foreigners (Zakon o strancima 2008). However, related notions and legal instru-
ments existed in the periods that preceded it. In this text I offer a diachronic overview 
of conceptual and procedural differences and discuss their entanglements, merging, 
spilling over and confrontation. In such a way, my aim is to point out their use as political 
statements in particular, as performatives affecting national and international political 
contexts. 
Keywords: refugees, asylum, migrants, Serbia, concepts
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the mass migration movements from Asia and Africa toward Europe in 2015, we 
have been witnessing developments which could be referred to as a “fight on labelling” 
Original scientific paper
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people on the move: discussions whether they are migrants or refugees go from strictly 
administrative settings, where the label determines someone’s access to rights, through 
political discourse, where this or that phrase serves as the basis for the justification of 
measures to be taken, through academic discourse, where scholars either support or try 
to deconstruct the adequacy of emic uses of the labels, all the way to everyday “expert” 
conversations between members of the general public at open markets, in public trans-
port, on the social media, etc., where collocutors agree or disagree on assertions that 
“these people are not refugees, but economic migrants” or “they are true refugees” as 
if refugeeness or migrantness were something observable, essential, accessible at first 
glance.1 However, this would be a mere figure of speech if it were not for the fact that 
wording influences worlding, and that the label given to a person, and more often to a 
whole group, did not have the capacity to profoundly affect their lives (on labelling, see 
Wood 2007; Zetter 1991). 
The words migrant and refugee serve to justify and/or officially legitimize a set of 
actions, attitudes, feelings, and administrative measures to be employed not only in the 
treatment of persons who are moving and to the movement itself, but also to define 
roles, relations, behaviors, and rights and responsibilities of all the actors involved, either 
institutional or individual. (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 25)
The perlocutionary force (Austin 1990) of these labels, the fact that we induce changes 
in the world by saying them, does not end here nor does it affect only the people directly 
involved in using these phrases, either as their targets or labelers, but it can go one context 
further, where the treatment of migrants and migrations and how it is conducted can be 
transformed into an instrument to achieve unrelated political and economic goals: the 
implementation of migration policies, related administrative measures, and the official dis-
course in Serbia is being transformed into one of the most prominent instruments to gain 
access to the EU, to its funds and institutions (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 25; see Beznec et al. 
2016; Stojić Mitrović et al. 2020). In other words, wording concerns not only biopolitics, but 
traditional politics as well. To call protagonists of the movement across Serbian territory 
refugees or migrants and act accordingly, became an instrument unto itself: an instrument 
of demonstrating the capability to “respect European core values” (in treating the people 
on the move humanely, as was the dominant paradigm in 2015) and/or “protect European 
borders” (as became the discursive leitmotif that justified securitization in 2016 or militari-
zation in 2020). Therefore, labelling has a strong perlocutionary component (Austin 1990), 
which transgresses direct use and even immediate effects and can aim instead at more 
distant targets. It must be stressed that this complex course could be understood less as a 
result of thorough planning and more accurately as a series of improvisations and ad hoc 
measures: the process is characterized by constant negotiations and modifications which 
reflect and try to influence the current geopolitical position of the Serbian state, shifts in 
1 This paper is the result of the research project The European Irregularized Migration Regime at the 
Periphery of the EU: From Ethnography to Keywords (Europski režim iregulariziranih migracija na periferiji 
EU: od etnografije do pojmovnika), ERIM (HRZZ IP-2019-04-6642).
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the migration policies of the neighboring countries, and the characteristics of the migrants’ 
arrival as they move toward the EU (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 23).
The present discourse concerning asylum and irregular migration, with all its concepts 
and institutions, techniques and code of conduct, was introduced in the Republic of Serbia 
through the EU Accession process. As a prerequisite for visa liberalization with the EU 
(achieved in 2009), Serbia signed readmission agreements with the EU and its member-
states and adopted the Asylum Law (Zakon o azilu 2007)2 and the Law on Foreigners 
(Zakon o strancima 2008).3 However, related notions and legal instruments existed in the 
periods that preceded it. 
In this paper I would like to offer a diachronic overview of the conceptual and pro-
cedural differences and open the discussion on their entanglements, merging, spilling 
over, confronting and to outline some of the modes in which they shaped the reception 
of migrants in Serbia in practice. The goal of the text is to indicate how the legislation 
and its application becomes an instrument for reaching distant political goals, which are 
not directly related to the attempts to regulate migration but more to affirm the political 
position in the international arena. 
2.1. THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
AND UNHCR: ASYLUM AND REFUGEE AS POLITICAL (UNDER)
STATEMENTS
Serbia, together with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia 
and Montenegro, comprised constitutive republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Yugoslav government, even though socialist, never came under 
direct Soviet influence, and built its own policy of neutrality, marked by a constant balance 
between the West and the East. Strong discrepancies with Soviet communism, which 
led to the so-called Tito-Stalin split in 1948, opened Yugoslavia’s doors for economic 
and political cooperation with the Western states and gave it a specific status among 
other socialist countries as “the most western socialist state of the Eastern bloc” (see, for 
example, Congressional Record 1963: 16559). During the Cold war period, Yugoslavia 
refused to align with the Warsaw pact, and took a neutral position. It initiated the Non-
Aligned Movement, which gathered the so-called developing world states, with the idea of 
avoiding official alignment with or against any large power bloc (Dinkel 2018). 
International dialogue fostered after the Second World War resulted in the creation of 
a set of legal instruments aimed at protecting victims of armed political conflicts (U.S. 
2 In 2018, a new law regulating asylum was adopted (Zakon o azilu i privremenoj zaštiti 2018). 
3 Similarly, in 2018, a new law on foreigners was adopted (Zakon o strancima 2018).
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Government Printing Office, 1951).4 The so-called reservations on part of Yugoslavia on a 
set of Geneva conventions for the Protection of War Victims, which it signed on 12 August 
1949, the first day when it was possible (the signing period was from 12 August 1949 to 12 
February 1950), indicated the direction of its decisive policy toward political independence 
combined with openness toward international cooperation in relation to the protection of 
civilians (Ibid.: 253–255). This paved the way for the subsequent approval of the Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion, and permitting the work of UNHCR on its territory. 
The specific political position of Yugoslavia led to the creation of a distinctive system 
for the protection of foreigners: SFRY ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention in 1960 (Krstić 
2012: 66) and the 1967 New York Protocol in 1967,5 but it had never formulated concrete 
legislative and institutional instruments of the asylum procedure as understood today 
(Jelačić 2013). However, in practice, the situation was different, protection was indeed 
provided, but in a rather specific manner: 
Faced with a growing number of asylum seekers from the neighboring countries, Eastern 
Europe and Africa in the early 1970s, and ill-equipped to deal with them, SFRY invited 
UNHCR to establish an operation in the country. UNHCR signed an Accord de Siège 
with the authorities and established an office in the capital of Belgrade in 1976. From 
the opening of the office until 2008, for a full 30 years, UNHCR decided on the basis of 
the Geneva Convention as to who meets the criteria to receive international protection, 
i.e. refugee status in the territory of Yugoslavia. With one additional obligation: since 
the state delegated the jurisdiction to UNHCR but it did not delegate its prerogatives 
in terms of granting asylum on its own territory, UNHCR’s additional task was to find a 
country of permanent residence for each and every person, that is, a foreigner, whose 
refugee status it determined. So, they were all relocated. No one could obtain refugee 
status from the UNHCR office and remain in Yugoslavia. It was like: “All right, we pretend 
we have nothing to do with it, yes, we tolerate you, if you give someone protection, go 
ahead and move him.”6 
As the majority of people granted asylum in the Belgrade office were from the so-called 
Eastern bloc states, this condition could be interpreted as avoidance of overt confrontation 
with the governments of these, otherwise allied states. Indeed, all persons that received 
international protection in SFRY, were transferred mostly to the USA, Canada or Australia. 
4 “In the light of the experiences of World War II, there was recognized by all governments the urgent 
necessity for rather extensive revisions for the above-mentioned [before WWII] earlier conventions for the 
purpose of bringing them up to date, making them easier to apply uniformly and less susceptible to dif-
ferent interpretations, and providing more effective protection of the categories of persons covered. It was 
considered equally important to secure by treaty international legal protection for civilians in belligerent and 
occupied territories. The generally unsatisfactory stop-gap measure to apply the prisoners-of-war conven-
tion to certain categories of civilians during World War II had pointed up the need for a separate treaty 
establishing humane standards of treatment for civilians in time of war” (U.S. Government Printing Office 
1951, A3).
5 http://demo.paragraf.rs/demo/combined/Old/t/t2003_09/t09_0095.htm (accessed 27 September 
2020).
6 Interview from 2014 with an UNHCR representative in Serbia.
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Protection of foreigners through the UNHCR mandate (Bianchini 2010: 368), that is, by 
allowing this UN organization to operate on and from its territory, was not the only one 
available in SFRY: in its Constitution it was stated that the right to asylum would be granted 
to persons being persecuted due to their support of democratic ideas and movements, 
social and national liberation, freedom and rights of human personality or freedom of 
scientific or artistic creation (Ustav SFRJ 1974, article 202).7 In practice, protection was 
obtained through ad hoc decisions of the Yugoslav government: it was given collectively, 
to people coming from countries disturbed by political upheavals, such as the Hungarian 
revolution in 1956, the arrival of the Warsaw pact army in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the 
assassination of Allende in Chile in 1973, the coup d’état in Argentina in 1976, and so on. 
In 1980, SFRY enacted a law regulating the movement and stay of foreigners (Zakon o 
kretanju i boravku stranaca 1980), where the distinction between the categories of asylum 
and refugee was firmly established (Stojić Mitrović 2014 a). While asylum referred to 
“foreigners who were persecuted for their support of democratic ideas and movements, 
social and national liberation, freedom and the rights of human personality or for the free-
dom of scientific or artistic creation,” the term refugee was defined as a person who “left 
the country, whose nationality s/he holds or in which s/he has permanent residence, in 
order to avoid persecution due to his/her progressive political strivings or his/her national, 
racial or religious affiliation” (Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca 1980, articles 44, 50). 
As pointed out elsewhere, the underlying idea was that a state had the sovereign right 
to choose to whom it would grant asylum perceived as a political one, while the status 
of refugees was considered to conform to the internationally agreed standards (Stojić 
Mitrović 2014 a: 1108). In practice, asylum was given to political dissidents who were seen 
as political allies, but refugee status also had a defining political note: it was given to all the 
nationals of certain states seeking protection after violent political overturns, when leftist 
governments were replaced in their countries of origin. With the UNHCR office in Belgrade 
which dealt with a part of people seeking protection on the territory of Yugoslavia but 
not having substantial interaction with Yugoslav institutions, together with autonomous 
protection of people in need, the state managed to politically balance between the East 
and the West, and remain in line with the political ideas and values it openly propagated. 
2.2. IZBEGLICE AS AN ETHNO-NATIONAL GROUP IN NEED  
OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DURING THE 1990s
After the death of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the state faced an intense 
economic and political crisis, which resulted in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. “The con-
flict was presented as based on ethnic and nationalist differences between the groups 
involved. Thus the dominant form of migration was the co-ethnic one: people searched 
7 This formulation was copied into the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Ustav Republike 
Srbije 1990, article 50). 
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for protection in the group of the same ‘ethnic origin’, or in the state perceived as their 
‘national or ethnic homeland’” (Beznec et al. 2016: 30; see Zlatanović 2015: 539 on co-
ethnic migration).
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), established on 27 April 1992 as one of the 
successors of SFRY, was comprised of the former republics of Serbia and Montenegro. FRY 
was under several rounds of economic and political sanctions by the UN Security Coun-
cil, and even participation in sport and cultural events was limited until 2001. Sanctions 
resulted in economic deterioration and political isolation of the FRY. However, according 
to official reports, more than 600,000 persons from the other former Yugoslav republics 
sought refuge in the FRY (UHNCR et al. [1996]: 19). Both units brought separate legal instru-
ments to regulate the reception of refugees. While Montenegro issued a by-law,8 Serbia 
responded with the adoption of a special Law on Refugees in 1992 (Zakon o izbeglicama 
1992),9 which explicitly defined refugees (izbeglice) exclusively on ethno-national basis, and 
the reasons for their displacement as a direct consequence of ethno-national aspirations 
of other ethno-national groups: “Serbs or members of other nationalities, who due to the 
pressures of Croatian or the governments of other republics,10 genocide threats, as well 
as persecution and discrimination on the basis of their religious or national belongings, 
or political views, were forced to leave their places of residence and flee onto the territory 
of the Republic of Serbia” (Zakon o izbeglicama 1992, article 1). This law focused on the 
admission of people, their accommodation and provision of aid, on humanitarian support 
in general, and not on defining the procedure for the determination of the legal and admin-
istrative status of the people (Stojić Mitrović 2014 a; a more detailed account is available 
in Krstić 2012: 68). This resulted in the creation of a specific image of a refugee: colored 
by a distinctive ethno-national connotation (a person who speaks the same language and 
belongs to/supports the same ethno-national group and is perceived to flee the place of 
origin exactly on that basis) and in need of direct humanitarian assistance. The dominant 
media imagery of the 1990s ex-Yu refugees was characterized by representations of misery, 
poverty, columns of people fleeing with just a few personal belongings, children, women 
and the elderly staring into cameras in silence. This imagery, which could be interpreted 
as aiming to evoke sorrow, empathy and compassion, combined with the notion of the 
same ethno-national belonging pervading both the political discourse and legislation, was 
in stark contrast with the not always positive reception of ex-Yu refugees in the general 
8 http://www.un.org.me/Library/Refugees-Asylum-Seekers-and-Statelessness/8%20Strategija%20za 
%20trajno%20rje%C5%A1avanje%20pitanja%20raseljenih%20i%20interno%20raseljenih%20lica%20
u%20Crnoj%20Gori.pdf (accessed 27 September 2020).
9 http://www.kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Migracije/O-migracijama/Zakon_o_izbeglicama.pdf (accessed 
27 September 2020).
10 http://www.kirs.gov.rs/media/uploads/Migracije/O-migracijama/Zakon_o_izbeglicama.pdf (acces 
sed 7 October 2020). In the 2010 amendment of the Law on Refugees (Zakon o izbeglicama 1992), Croatian 
was left out from Article 1, which was reformulated as: “Persons who escaped due to the events from 1991 
to 1998 and their consequences or were expelled from the former Yugoslav republics to the territory of 
the Republic of Serbia, and cannot, for fear of persecution or discrimination, or do not want to return to the 
territory from which they fled, including those who opted for integration” (see Krstić 2012: 67).
153
NU 57/2, 2020. pp 147–167 MARTA STOJIĆ MITROVIĆ | IZBEGLICE (REFUGEES), AZILANTI (ASYLUM SEEKERS)…
population,11 brutal violations of the rights of refugees12 including forced mobilization,13 as 
well as in contrast with the inadequate administrative system, which continued to keep 
refugees legally outside of society (UNHCR et al. [1996]) – only in 1997, with the Law on 
Citizenship of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Zakon o jugoslovenskom državljanstvu 
1996), did refugees obtain slightly easier access to Serbian citizenship. However, this law 
set restrictive conditions for obtaining citizenship: only those citizens of the SFRY who had 
residence on the territory of the FRY before it was established on 27 April 1992, could 
automatically get FRY citizenship, which practically excluded the majority of refugees. 
Those who arrived after that date, could be “granted Yugoslav citizenship only by the federal 
or republic ministries of internal affairs, which had discretionary powers whether or not 
the requirements were met, and were bound to ‘take into account the interests of security 
and defense and the international position of Yugoslavia’ (Article 48)” (Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights 2004: 54). Only after the political changes in 2000, the law was amended 
in 2001 to allow for easier access to citizenship for persons from SFRY actually residing on 
the territory of Serbia, and it excluded the previously existing condition to prove “loyalty to 
the receiving state” (Dimitrijević 2008: 306).
Izbeglice thus produced complex imagery, where the emphasis on the humanitarian hid 
the political understructure and uses in the perpetuation and energizing of ethno-national 
confrontations and power struggles on the national, regional and international level. The 
existential precarity which manifested itself above all in the form of constant questioning 
of their right to remain, rendered them as some awkward parts of the society and players 
in the political scene, us, but not us fully, allies and supporters, but whose loyalty was yet 
to be proven.
2.3. AZILANTI AS CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA  
IN THE EU
Immediately after the Slobodan Milošević regime was overthrown in 2000, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and its successors, The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and 
11 For example, Nin weekly reports that the admission of refugees was highly politicized: certain groups 
of people were simply not admitted, but forced back or moved to specified locations outside borders of the 
FRY, to Republika Srpska or Republika Srpska Krajina, but also to some areas in the FRY where dominant 
population declared as not being ethnic Serb. Negative stereotyping was present (some of the attributes 
which were used are: invasive, criminal, uncivilized, aggressive), and, as the money arriving for refugees 
diminished and political situation changed not in favor of the FRY, the administrative obstacles for issuance 
of basic documents intensified (Gojgić 1997). See also https://www.portalnovosti.com/ovdje-ubijani-tamo-
ponizavani (accessed 26 September 2020).
12 An overview of the violations conducted by the state in relation to the ex-Yugoslav refugees is available at: 
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Pod-lupom-Kr%C5%A1enje-prava-izbeglica-u-SCG1. 
pdf (accessed 27 September 2020).
13 https://www.ian.org.rs/arhiva/publikacije/erdut/knjiga/knjiga%20srp.pdf (accessed 27 September 
2020).
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the Republic of Serbia, introduced accession to the EU as the major political goal. This 
was followed by legislative and institutional transformations (within the EU administrative 
framework of developing human rights, democracy, rule of law, free market economy, 
reconciliation and strengthening cooperation of the Western Balkan states etc.) where 
migration policy was one of the central issues. Especially within the so-called visa liberali-
zation process, formalized by the Visa liberalization with Serbia Roadmap (2008),14 Serbia 
took on the obligation to impose control of movement of its own as well as third-state 
nationals toward EU member-states, for which it received financial and other support 
from the EU, directly, or through the NGO sector (Stojić Mitrović and Vilenica 2019). The 
movement across and within Serbian borders was to be controlled by both technical and 
administrative means, that is, the introduction of biometric passports, the application of 
specialized technical equipment, as well as new legislation and institutional infrastructure. 
The Law on State Border Protection (Zakon o zaštiti državne granice 2008),15 the Law 
on Travel Documents (Zakon o putnim ispravama 2007), the Asylum Law (Zakon o azilu 
2007), the Law on Foreigners (Zakon o strancima 2008), the Law on Migration Manage-
ment (Zakon o upravljanju migracijama 2012), readmission agreements with the EU, its 
member-states and neighboring states, established new procedures and concepts, and 
allocated jurisdictions to re-formed or newly formed institutions.
First provisions in this process were directed toward the control of movement of Serbian 
nationals, who sought asylum in the EU member states, trying to escape transgenerational 
structural violence, never-ending political tensions and poverty (in 2010, 14,615, while in 
2018 Serbian citizens logged 4,445 new applications in the EU).16 Serbia was to control 
movement of its own nationals through the issuance of biometric passports, “targeted 
control on exit borders” (that is, through racial profiling, since the Roma people comprise 
the majority of asylum seekers in the EU, see, for example, Knezevic Kruta 2019: 198) and 
readmission agreements, which obliged it to accept back its nationals who were refused 
stay in the EU member states, and organize their accommodation and other provisions 
when needed. With the funding provided by the EU, the state and civil sector initialized 
different “awareness campaigns”17 to prevent its own nationals from seeking asylum in the 
EU by pointing to risks of human trafficking, extremely low recognition rates and possibili-
ties for other forms of legalizing work and stay in the EU.
In public discourse, azilanti began to be attached to Serbian nationals who are not 
“ethnic Serbs”: “Yes, there are a lot of asylum seekers from Serbia, but they are Roma 
14 https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/White%20List%20Project%20Paper%20-%20Roadmap%20Serbia.pdf 
(accessed 20 July 2020).
15 In 2018, new law regulating border control was adopted (Zakon o graničnoj kontroli 2018).
16 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Number_of_first-time_applica 
nts_for_asylum_from_citizens_of_enlargement_countries,_EU-28,_2008-2018_(number_of_persons)_
CPC2019.png (accessed 20 July 2020).
17 https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0213708ENC.pdf (accessed 27 September 
2020).
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and Albanians” (to paraphrase a Serbian journalist),18 as well as to those who come from 
extreme poverty.19 The sheer number of people with Serbian citizenship seeking asylum 
in the EU member states and being declined has been presented as a threat to visa-free 
travel, established after years and years of political and institutional transformations and 
negotiations (Jokanović 2011). This narrative has been occasionally reappearing, and it 
was most recently widely utilized in 2014–2015 regarding the migration of people with 
identification documents issued by the institutions of Kosovo, which Serbia does not 
recognize:20 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dačić, stated today that mass migrations of Alba-
nians from Kosovo are not a problem for Serbia and that citizens can rest assured that 
there would be no reintroduction of visas. […] “The European Union and those countries 
that have recognized Kosovo should not be hypocritical and when they negotiate the 
status of Kosovo, they say – you have nothing to do with Kosovo, and when there are 
routes of illegal migration, they should consider them citizens of Serbia”, Dačić said. 
They are those who insisted on the freedom of movement of Kosovo Albanians.21 
Moreover, in Serbia, similarly as in other places in Europe, it was very common to hear 
or read narratives in the media that questioned the intentions of these people: they were 
often presented as fake asylum seekers, those who used the asylum system as a means 
for achieving something other than international protection, either as a way to enter a 
country, legalize their stay, or get various advantages, for example, financial benefits such 
as “pocket money”, free accommodation, food, money for voluntary return, etc. (Stojić 
Mitrović 2018). As I mentioned elsewhere, this added a special layer of connotation to this 
phrase: dishonesty and inclination to fraud (Stojić Mitrović 2018).
Thus, the concepts of izbeglice and azilanti are perceived as categories that are easily 
conceived of as referring to a kind of primordial group identity and not a situation in which 
persons find themselves, as collective and not individually assessed categories. While 
izbeglice are mostly Serbs, but not quite citizens of Serbia, azilanti are citizens of Serbia, 
but not quite Serbs.
18 https://www.lopusina.com/2016/07/11/rasizam-na-evropski-nacin/ (accessed 20 July 2020).
19 “In Serbia, a certain number of so-called ‘fake asylum seekers’, i.e. domestic citizens seeking asylum 
in the EU countries, even though they are not subjected to persecution on the grounds required for getting 
asylum, recently appeared. After visa liberalization for the citizens of the Republic of Serbia in December 
2009, in the next year alone 17,000 people from Serbia sought asylum in the EU countries, especially in 
Sweden, Belgium and Germany. This primarily concerns poor citizens who sought asylum, believing that 
their life in the EU countries would be easier. About 95% of them are Roma, and the rest are mostly Albanian 
minorities from Preševo and Bujanovac. These people often sell off all their assets to get a started in life in 
the foreign country, and if they are returned on the basis of the readmission agreement, it poses the question 
whether it is fair to apply to them special benefits that are provided to others returnees” (Krstić 2012: 19).
20 According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. https://unmik.unmissions.org/united-
nations-resolution-1244 (accessed 20 July 2020).
21 “Dačić: Nema uvođenja viza zbog migracija sa Kosova”. Radio 021, 14 Feb 2015. https://www.021.
rs/story/Info/Srbija/101433/Dacic-Nema-uvodjenja-viza-zbog-migracija-sa-Kosova.html (accessed 1 July 
2020).
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These connotations were present, alive and deeply rooted when third-state nationals, 
those who were neither Serbs nor citizens of Serbia, came into the focus of migration 
policies, practices and discourse in Serbia and clashed with the assessment of asylum 
claims on the individual level demanded by the Geneva Convention and ensuing national 
laws. However, it was here that things became even more complicated.
2.4. ILEGALNI/NEREGULARNI/EKONOMSKI MIGRANTI (ILLEGAL/
IRREGULAR/ECONOMIC MIGRANTS) 
The terminology which is dominating the contemporary discourse has only recently been 
established in Serbia. Although the law regulating the movement and stay of foreigners in 
SFRY (Zakon o kretanju i boravku stranaca 1980, articles 25, 34) addresses the prohibition 
of entry into the country or the cancellation of residence to foreigners, it does not offer a 
specific category related to what is today called irregular migration. Only the beginning 
of the Process of Stabilization and Accession of Serbia to the European Union (launch-
ing confirmed in 2003)22 led to the gradual adoption of the term illegal migration in the 
bilateral communication between Serbia and the EU. The reason for this was not a change 
in migration practices, which demanded the recognition of a new category of persons, or 
a new manner of crossing borders, but of directly political nature, to harmonize national 
legislation with the one existing in the EU. This was a long process which developed in 
phases. 
For example, certain modus operandi had been established, despite the lack of specific 
legal and administrative provisions. In the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
World Refugee Survey 2005 – Serbia and Montenegro report we read: 
The Government routinely imprisoned undocumented asylum seekers from outside the 
former Yugoslavia up to 30 days, throughout which they had no access to counsel, when it 
did not summarily deport them… Those the Government could not identify or document, 
including those whose documents traffickers had taken, generally remained in detention 
indefinitely without judicial review or independent monitoring of their conditions… Asylum 
seekers had to have a police permit to travel within the country, but UNHCR cautioned 
against travel as authorities could suspect and charge them with attempting to leave the 
country illegally. (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2005)
Only the framework of the visa liberalization process led toward the establishment of cat-
egories of illegal/irregular migration/migrants; moreover, these derived not from laws, but 
from strategies. For example, neither the Asylum Law (Zakon o azilu 2007) nor the Law 
on Foreigners (Zakon o strancima 2008) recognize any particular category of migrants or 
migration that would be labelled irregular or illegal. However, in the strategy for “combat-
22 Overview of the process is available at http://europa.rs/serbia-and-the-eu/milestones/?lang=en 
(accessed 20 July 2020).
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ing illegal migration” for the period 2009–2014 (Strategija suprotstavljanja ilegalnim mi-
gracijama za period 2009–2014, 2009), adopted by the Serbian Government on March 
26, 2009 as the first of this kind, the terms illegal migration and illegal migrants appear 
and are defined as follows: Illegal migration is any movement of a population from one 
country to another, which does not comply with the applicable regulations of the country 
of origin and destination, as well as a stay in a particular country contrary to the applicable 
regulations of that state. Illegal migrant is a foreign national who illegally entered/exited 
another country (entry outside a border crossing, entry with a forged or otherwise irregular 
travel document) for residence or permanent residence. Persons who have legally entered 
the country but who did not leave the country after their legal stay expired have the same 
meaning. This strategy also introduced the concept of a potential illegal migrant, which 
refers to any person who is not allowed to enter the territory of a particular country, as 
well as a person who does not obtain a positive decision on a visa application (Strategija 
suprotstavljanja ilegalnim migracijama za period 2009–2014, 2009: Annex 1). Also, this 
strategy states very explicitly that illegal migration is administratively treated as a form of 
organized crime (ibid., Article 1). Later, in the 2009 migration management strategy docu-
ment (Strategija za upravljanje migracijama 2009), the term illegal migration or migrant 
was used as the equivalent of irregular migration or migrant.23 
This terminology mainly remained in professional, policing discourse, and was only 
rarely taken up by the media. Migration of third-country nationals was rather invisible until 
2011, the time of the first organized protests by local residents against the presence of 
migrants in Banja Koviljača (Stojić Mitrović 2014 b). From 2011 to 2015 it only sporadically 
made headlines and always in relation to asylum. The expression azilanti was commonly 
used and not necessarily in a derogatory context, to refer to third country nationals,24 
interchangeably with migranti (migrants) or ilegalni migranti (illegal migrants), that is, 
23 And as a side note, the term ilegalci, which is colloquially used to depict migrants unrecognized as 
having justified basis to be in Serbia, had actually been used for political activists and spies in SFRY.
24 It is necessary to mention that unlike in the SFRY period, where asylum and refugee were separate 
categories, with the legislative transformations within the visa liberalization process, they became phases of 
the same proceeding: “Asylum shall be understood to mean the right to residence and protection accorded 
to an alien to whom, on the basis of a decision of the competent authority deciding on his/her application 
for asylum in the Republic of Serbia, refuge or another form of protection provided for by this Law was 
granted; […] an asylum seeker shall be understood to mean an alien who has filed an application for asylum 
on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, on whose application a final decision has not been taken; a refugee 
shall be understood to mean a person who, on account of well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, sex, language, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is 
not in the country of his/her origin, and is unable or unwilling, owing to such fear, to avail him/herself of 
the protection of that country, as well as a stateless person who is outside the country of his/her previous 
habitual residence, and who is unable or unwilling, owing to such fear, to return to that country; refuge shall 
be understood to mean the right to residence and protection granted to an refugee who is on the territory 
of the Republic of Serbia, with respect to whom the competent authority has determined that his/her fear 
of persecution is well-founded; subsidiary protection shall be understood to mean a form of protection the 
Republic of Serbia grants to an alien who would be subjected, if returned to the country of origin, to torture, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, or where his/her life, safety or freedom would be threatened by general-
ized violence caused by external aggression or internal armed conflicts or massive violation of human rights” 
(Zakon o azilu 2007, article 2 [unofficial translation, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47b46e2f9.
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irrespective of their administrative status. Biopolitical polarization, which is extensively 
discussed in academic literature (De Genova and Roy 2020; Anderson 2008) has only 
gradually, and in the course of several years, been absorbed into the public discourse as 
essentially related to a specific category of persons, either opposed to or as an extension 
of azilanti. 
As explained elsewhere (Belgrade Centre for Human Right 2014, Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights 2013), the Serbian asylum system represents a variant of the so-called 
policy of non-doing (McConnell and t’ Hart 2014), when policy is defined, legislation 
enacted, institutions established, but practice does not fit in and a policy of inaction, 
deliberate or not, is discursively justified by a number of economic, institutional, human 
resources and many other reasons (Stojić Mitrović 2016). In Serbia, people would get a 
document confirming that they expressed intention to seek asylum (“a 72 hour paper”, 
see Beznec et al. 2016), but were prevented from continuing the asylum procedure, since 
the following phase could be accomplished only from within asylum centers – not getting 
into an asylum center deprived people of obtaining the status of an asylum seeker and 
kept them in a liminal position (see Stojić Mitrović and Meh 2015). Since the capacities for 
accommodation were far from sufficient, the expression of the intention to seek asylum 
expired. Asylum centers were the only type of official accommodation centers until 2015, 
and people on the move gathered in their proximity, in addition to a big squat in the north 
(Beznec et al. 2016). On one hand, the state fulfilled the EU demands to establish the 
asylum system, on the other, it continued with the practices of inaction, similarly as in 
the previous period and refugees of the 1990s: the politics of uncertainty (Stel 2020). 
With this, it avoided administrative binding of third-country nationals to Serbia and the 
responsibility for them, produced vulnerabilities which only facilitated their need to con-
tinue their journey, kept people in legal limbo and thus made them prone to untransparent 
practices conducted by the state authorities effectively excluding them from the society. 
Unlike refugees from the former Yugoslavia, people on the move did not have the social 
capital to improve their situation and overcome obstacles. In public discourse, azilanti and 
migranti was used interchangeably, adequately reflecting the rather confused practice. 
However, in 2015 the situation radically changed. Following the UNHCR campaign in the 
wake of the World Refugee Day on June 20 to spread awareness on reports of an unprec-
edented number of refugees and the refugee crisis, this debate entered the Serbian public. 
National and local media alike ran articles and/or expert interviews trying to disentangle 
this ambivalence and established “terminological negotiability” (Lukić Krstanović 2016: 
62) as the new normal in public discourse: 
It is a common practice in the domestic and foreign media, as well as the public, to call 
people fleeing the war in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan migrants, and even illegal migrants. 
The expert public warns that 95% of the situations are actually refugees, whose status 
html (accessed 20 July 2020)]). This unofficial translation of the Zakon o azilu 2007, uses the phrase alien 
instead of more common variant foreigner. 
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provides a much wider range of human rights than those of, say, economic or political 
migrants. A refugee, for example, is not obliged to legally cross the borders on the way 
from his own country where there is a state of war, to the final destination, because he is 
fleeing from his home country in order to save his bare life. “The basic right of a refugee 
is, when he comes to the territory of a third country, what we call the state of refuge, he 
must not be returned to a state where he would be threatened by persecution. A refugee 
must not be punished for illegally crossing the state border, that is, for illegally staying 
in the state of refuge,” Pavle Kilibarda, a researcher at the Belgrade Center for Human 
Rights, told RTV. (Žigić 2015)
Day after day, the world media report on thousands of people arriving in Europe from 
crisis and poor areas of the world, while the debate on whether they should be described 
as refugees or migrants continues, 
Blic daily reports and continues: 
There is a significant difference in legal terms between these phrases – a refugee is a 
person who has the right to protection under international law, and a migrant is a person 
who moves in search of a better life.25
Radio 021 concludes: 
They call them migrants, asylum seekers, refugees. Neither the state authorities nor the 
experts dealing with migration and refugee issues agree on what to call these people. 
The question is not linguistic but political: it depends on the answer whether they would 
let you cross the border or leave you in front of the Hungarian wall.26 
The state acknowledged that the question of identification is difficult to answer by appoint-
ing a special body formed in the spring of 2015, Working Group for Solving Problems of 
Mixed Migration Flows. However, the performative potential of calling people refugees 
or migrants was also recognized: “The concept of refugee was used to evoke empathy, 
and migrants to stress the economic and voluntary aspect of migration” (Stojić Mitrović 
2019: 23). But the perlocutionary force of these phrases when used in specific contexts 
is something that should be mentioned. The Serbian state and especially its institution 
responsible for the accommodation of migrants, the Commissariat for Refugees and 
Migrations, represents its approach to treating migrants while in Serbia as non-violent 
and dignified, stressing that accommodation centers are of the open type and that needs 
of specific groups are fulfilled,27 as means to affirm that it respects human rights and 
the rule of law, demands formulated in the negotiation chapters 23 and 24 within the EU 
Accession process. Furthermore, by emphasizing the “extraordinarily humane approach” 
25 “DEBATA O IMENU Migranti, ili izbeglice?”. Blic, 28 Aug. 2015. https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/
debata-o-imenu-migranti-ili-izbeglice/e2dwqy9 (accessed 1 July 2020)
26 “Migranti ili izbeglice – nije lingvističko već političko pitanje”. Radio 021, 15 Aug. 2015.https://www.021.
rs/story/Info/Srbija/115288/Migranti-ili-izbeglice-nije-lingvisticko-vec-politicko-pitanje.html (accessed 1 
July 2020).
27 http://rs.n1info.com/Svet/a215836/Svi-prihvatni-centri-spremni-za-zimu.html (accessed 1 October 
2020).
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in direct confrontation with the treatment of people on the move in the neighboring 
states (“The others are beating them, Serbia is helping”,28 “They are the first ones who 
do not treat us as animals”29), it was possible to infer that Serbia is done with its violent 
ethno-national past. Serbian institutions could build international reputation that they have 
“the know-how” with regard to the humane reception of large numbers of people in a 
short time span.30 This reputation opened the door for better access to European funds.31 
Indeed, in December 2015, the state opened its first negotiation chapters in the EU Ac-
cession process.32
Helping refugees was not limited to the state: without accessing status, the refugee crisis 
was the dominant, uncritically accepted frame through which migration was treated and 
talked about in the humanitarian sector, as it brought additional moral justification for their 
work. The phrase izbeglice was occasionally intentionally used in order to affect the emo-
tions of the Serbian public by introducing a direct relation with the refugee experiences 
from the 1990s. For example, the first open call for donations in Belgrade, after which the 
distribution hub Miksalište was formed, directly evoked Serbs fleeing Croatia in 1995, 20 
years earlier to the day.33 
It is precisely this possibility of relating ex-Yu refugees to people turning to the Serbian 
asylum system that was decisively negated in anti-migrant discourse: “They are economic 
migrants, I know what a refugee is,” “You cannot compare refugees from Yugoslavia with 
these guys,” “We waited in front of embassies in lines to get our documents, we did not 
breach laws”, “We behaved in a civilized manner in camps”, are just some of the nar-
rations encountered on the social media especially in anti-migrant groups in Serbia.34 
Furthermore, the refugeness was denied on a visual basis, as people were said to be too 
male, too young, wealthy, healthy and so on, to be real refugees. 
In actual reception practice, the administrative dichotomy between refugees and mi-
grants does not bear much importance, since the number of people being granted refuge 
is both proportionally and absolutely rather small (200 positive decisions since 2008 out 
of almost a million intentions to seek asylum issued),35 and people are treated equally 
irrespective of their administrative status (they can access services or be deported regard-
28 https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/drugi-ih-tuku-srbija-pomaze/h60h099 (accessed 20 July 2020).
29 https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2015&mm=09&dd=10&nav_category=12&nav_id=1 
037338 (accessed 20 July 2020).
30 https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/2043138/Vu%C4%8Di%C4%87%3A+Hvala+No
rve%C5%A1koj%2C+izbeglice+nam+nisu+veliki+problem.html (accessed 20 July 2020).
31 http://europa.rs/tag/podrska-eu-za-izbeglice-i-migrante/ (accessed 20 July 2020).
32 https://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/2139802/dan-za-istoriju-srbija-otvorila-prva-pog 
lavlja-pregovora-sa-eu.html (accessed 1 October 2020).
33 https://p-portal.net/savamala-otvorenog-srca-prikupljanje-pomoci-za-migrante/ (accessed 20 July 
2020).
34 https://www.facebook.com/groups/512775282720731/ (accessed 20 July 2020).
35 http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a611553/Komeserijat-U-Srbiji-4.800-migranata-od-2008.-godine-173-os 
obe-dobile-azil.html (accessed 20 July 2020).
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less of the paper they do or do not hold) (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 23). Nevertheless, when the 
official EU policy got an openly securitarian turn in 2016 (see Beznec et al. 2016), refugees 
gave way to migrants for Serbian politicians.36 “Protecting borders of Europe” by deterring 
migrants from entering Serbia and leaving further toward the EU was now the main way of 
operational and even institutional integration of Serbia into the European Border Regime, 
achieved through increased police cooperation of ex-Yugoslav states and the EU member 
states and negotiation of Frontex, which is being deployed on territories of states which are 
not part of the EU (for a more detailed account see Stojić Mitrović et al. 2020). 
Interestingly, to avoid the dichotomy between refugees and migrants and connotations 
these phrases entail, in official NGO reports the terms beneficiaries and people in need 
are used most often (Stojić Mitrović 2019: 23). 
The concept of economic migrants entered the Serbian public discourse as a direct 
follow up of a UNHCR campaign that began in spring 2015 (not only in Serbia): “these 
people are not migrants, they are refugees”, as the chief of the UNHCR in Serbia told dur-
ing the opening night of the Miksalište distribution hub in August 2015.37 The explanation 
of the concept of refugees in the glossary which could be found in 2015 on the page of 
UNHCR, was directly confronted to the concept of economic migrants: while refugees are 
forced to flee due to some objective circumstances, migrants, and especially economic 
migrants, choose to migrate themselves.38 In later versions, this emphasized dichotomy 
was moderated.39 However, this dichotomy, that refugees and economic migrants are fun-
damentally different and that this difference is discernible, if not even obvious, pervades 
contemporary official reception practices and public discourse. The phrase economic 
migrant is used to stress that a person has no right to asylum and refugee status, as he/
she is not forcefully displaced by wars, and has no right to legally enter or stay in a state. It 
univocally establishes poverty as one of the main motives for migration and, ipso facto, as 
something that automatically results in the rejection of the asylum claim, that is, one of the 
only available ways for legalization of status for the majority of Earth’s human population.
The phrase economic migrants dominates the contemporary discourse in Serbia. A 
lot of Serbian nationals use facilitated entrance into the German labor market resulting 
in increased emigration (Radulović 2019) which is presented as the main demographic 
problem in Serbia, adding to “depopulation”, which is again read mostly as a problem 
when “depopulation” refers to the departure of “Serbs”, and especially “educated Serbs”: 
36 https://www.danas.rs/politika/vucic-srbija-nece-biti-parking-za-migrante-ako-zatreba-zatvoricemo-
granicu/ (accessed 20 July 2020).
37 For similar phrasing see https://www.cenzolovka.rs/iz-prve-ruke/zasto-mediji-izbeglice-pretvaraju-u-
migrante/ (accessed 29 September 2020).
38 The UNHCR page has been altered, but reflections on older version of the glossary can be found on htt-
ps://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html or https: 
//www.humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/an-alternative-vocabulary-for-reporting-on-migration-is-
sues-on-politics-ethics-and-the-news-medias-contested-migration-terminology/ (accessed 29 September 
2020).
39 https://www.refworld.org/docid/56e81c0d4.html (accessed 10 October 2020).
162
NU 57/2, 2020. pp 147–167MARTA STOJIĆ MITROVIĆ | IZBEGLICE (REFUGEES), AZILANTI (ASYLUM SEEKERS)…
for example, the Serbian tabloid Alo! puts statistics under the headline “Statistics are Dev-
astating. Serbs, if we continue like this, there will be NO more of us!40 Settling of third-state 
nationals from Africa and Asia in depopulated areas has sporadically been mentioned in 
the media, but also immediately refused as a solution “due to cultural/religious differences”. 
In the end of 2019, the narrative that the Serbian state is secretly planning to settle thou-
sands of migrants from the Middle East and Africa to Serbia began to get unprecedented 
attention in the Serbian public, as visible through numerous protests, petitions and social 
media groups which demanded the removal of migrants from Serbia. Very often, funding 
for the permanent solution to accommodating refugees from the former Yugoslavia, such 
as provision of construction material, houses or flats, has been presented as intended for 
“buying houses for migrants”, and the state has been accused of favoring foreigners to 
its own citizens.41 Similarly, readmission agreements are causing discussions in which the 
top officials are accused of betraying citizens and “endangering them by migrants”, for 
shady personal economic benefits.42 Even a lexical construction of doing migration to a 
place is present (“stop migration of Serbia”, “stop migration of Kikinda”).43 During the state 
of emergency introduced in March 2020 in order to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic, a 
Facebook group, STOP naseljavanju migranata (STOP Settlement of Migrants), grew by 
300,000 new members in ten days (Stojić Mitrović et al. 2020).44 One of the narratives 
was that the state introduced lockdown and curfew hours to keep citizens at home, so 
they would not be able to witness while migrants were being imported and settled across 
Serbia (for an analysis of these narratives, see Marinković 2020). An active part of this 
group organized into “Narodne patrole” (People’s patrols), conducting “patrols” in areas 
where people on the move gather, and they “instruct” them to leave and not to “make 
problems” while in Serbia.45 They also organize anti-migrant protests in different parts of 
Serbia46 and activities such as simultaneous protests in support of similar anti-migrant 
and anti-mask groups in Europe.47 These forms of public activism indicate not only that a 
negative connotation of the term migration is becoming the norm, but also that migration 
is persistently read from an ethno-national position, and even a position of international 
nationalism. 
40 “STATISTIKA JE PORAŽAVAJUĆA Srbi, ako nastavimo ovako, više nas NEĆE BITI!”, 29 Jun 2018. htt-
ps://www.alo.rs/vesti/drustvo/srbi-ako-nastavimo-ovako-vise-nas-nece-biti/172975/vest (accessed 1 July 
2020).
41 https://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/komesarijat-demantuje-vest-o-kupovini-kuca-migrantima_992916.
html, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/komesarijat-drzava-migrantima-ne-kupuje-kuce/bczz2wz (acces 
sed 1 October 2020).
42 The latest spree was caused by the revelation of a deal between Serbia and Austria: https://www.
danas.rs/politika/centar-za-ljudska-prava-trazi-od-vlasti-detalje-sporazuma-o-vracanju-migranata-iz-
austrije/ (accessed 1 October 2020).
43 https://www.facebook.com/Srbijaprotivmigranata/videos/176948540373589 (accessed 1 October 
2020).
44 https://www.facebook.com/groups/512775282720731 (accessed 10 October 2020).
45 https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/srbija-51761864 (accessed 1 October 2020).
46 https://www.soinfo.org/vesti/tag/narodna%20patrola/ (accessed 1 October 2020).
47 https://www.facebook.com/narodnapatrola (accessed 1 October 2020).
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3. CONCLUSION
In public and social media, people are being transformed into amorphous masses of vic-
tims, villains, or fragmented numbers, quotas, percentages; elliptical narratives are often 
focused on “exemplar” events and more or less loosely build on de-contextualized official 
reports, strategies, risk analysis, and other forms of outputs with epistocratic ambition,48 
thus openly supporting or going against simplistically presented official policies or “hidden 
agendas”, i.e., perceptions of migration-related assemblages, hegemonic structures, their 
counterparts, actors, agencies and their relations. Terminology, “how to call these people”, 
serves as an overarching label, which implies a whole set of meanings, assumptions, world 
views. As Lukić Krstanović notices, “migration terms are now becoming an instrument, not 
only for normativisation of migrant protection and (inter)national security, but also for 
causing complete commotion among the public, i.e., creating stimuli with affective value 
in the process of categorizing people” (Lukić Krstanović 2016: 64).
Unlike the terminology of asylum and refugee, which had their counterparts in the pre-
ceding domestic legislation and public discourse, the EU Accession process first brought 
illegal migration/migrants and its more politically correct version of irregular migration/
migrants and later economic migrants into speaking about and treating people who were 
neither former co-citizens nor “co-ethnics”. Illegal/irregular migration/migrants as well 
as asylum, were initially just concepts, phrases used in legislation needed to meet the 
demands in the EU negotiation process. Their initial perlocutionary force, to paraphrase 
Austin, was to show that Serbia is adopting EU-tailored legislation and institutional organi-
zation, to make a political statement that it is on its way to EU membership. Only later did 
they begin to profoundly affect the lives of people on the move and to serve as symbols 
able to mobilize the local population to articulate their dissatisfaction with the current state 
of affairs. These uncertainties were not always closely related to migration per se, but were 
framed as existential threats (Huysmans 2006) and channeled through the concept and 
imagery of the migrant. To paraphrase Austin (1990) again, changed terminology now 
obtained a perlocutionary force masked into an illocutionary one: calling someone a refu-
gee, azilant, illegal/irregular/economic migrant is not a simple act of naming, or making 
a judgement, or filling-in an administrative field; it represents allocating a special position, 
role and relation with other groups. Terminology becomes a metaphor, an “abstraction 
through which the expression used as metaphor loses its reference to an individual object 
and takes on a general value” (Ricoeur 1994: 107). 
In this text the concepts were described to indicate one particular use: that of political 
statements. From asylum and refugee in complementary activities of the SFRY govern-
ment and UNHCR, which affirmed the position of SFRY in-between the East and West and 
as the torchbearer of the Non-Alignment Movement, through restricting refugenees to 
certain ethno-national groups, limiting visual imageries and using fleeing people to tip the 
48 On migration-related epistocracy, see Stojić Mitrović 2016
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balance in regional political fights for power and territories and to pump up ethno-national 
feelings during the 1990s, through the definition of azilanti as “internal-others” that can 
easily endanger the painstakingly obtained facilitation of movement and political and 
economic course toward EU by the state and its citizens, to the use of refugees and (eco-
nomic) migrants alike to push the accession process, get access to funds and become an 
indispensable operational partner of the EU as well as to accentuate belonging to Europe, 
through values, behaviors and self-identification against azilanti, refugees and migrants, 
these terms showed strong performative potential. Mechanisms of political worlding 
through wording can get their contours precisely by deconstructing the use of performa-
tives and manipulations with inscribed meanings on the national and international arena.
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IZBJEGLICE, AZILANTI I ILEGALNI MIGRANTI U 
ADMINISTRATIVNOM I JAVNOM DISKURSU U SRBIJI:  
PREGLED KONCEPATA U DIJAKRONIJSKOJ PERSPEKTIVI
Sadašnji diskurs o azilu i iregularnoj migraciji, sa svim njegovim konceptima i instituci-
jama, tehnikama i kodeksom ponašanja, uveden je u Republiku Srbiju kroz tzv. proces 
pristupanja Europskoj uniji. Kao preduvjet liberalizacije viznog režima s Europskom 
unijom (postignute 2009. godine), Srbija je potpisala sporazume o readmisiji s Europ-
skom unijom i njezinim državama članicama, te usvojila Zakon o azilu (2007.) i Zakon o 
strancima (2008.). Međutim, bliski pojmovi i pravni instrumenti postojali su i prethod-
nim periodima. U ovom tekstu dajem dijakronijski pregled konceptualnih i proceduralnih 
razlika i govorim o njihovim preplitanjima, spajanju, prelijevanju i sučeljavanju. Time 
pokušavam indicirati prije svega njihovu uporabu u svojstvu političkih izjava, tj. kao 
performative koji utječu na nacionalni i međunarodni politički kontekst.
Ključne riječi: izbjeglice, azil, migrant, Srbija, koncepti
